ZKEA

Emerging Diseases : Biological Terrorism : Biological Warfare

War & Weaponization

Theoretically pathogenic agents have always been the perfect potential weapon: they are inexpensive, relatively easy to manufacture, and can inflict extremely high casualties on the enemy. In fact, nothing beats a biological weapon in pure killing power: the right weapon applied at the right time can literally annihilate an entire population. (In fact, history demonstrates that the unintentional release of pathogenic organisms can destroy a nation). Further, such a weapon has the tremendous side-benefit of not destroying infrastructure. Valuable buildings and capital are left intact - it is only the hated enemy themselves who are destroyed. The conquerer can thus move right in and make use of the enemy's houses, televisions and recreational vehicles. Who could ask for more?

These weapons also deliver a potent psychological element: fear. Fear of disease is fundamental, particularly disease that manifests itself in a widespread epidemic. Thus the mere presence of a weaponized disease in the ranks of an army or populace can create a extraordinary amount of panic and chaos, far above and beyond the actual mortality of the sickness itself. Such chaos in the ranks of the enemy is, itself, militarily useful.

Of course, nothing is ever as easy as it seems. So despite these compelling advantages, there are major technical roadblocks to these weapons. Two of the most important are viability and dispersion.

Living organisms require special loving care. Unlike a nuclear weapon, you can't simply mount a biological warhead on a missile and fire it. The organisms in the warhead must be kept in a viable and infectious state in order to remain effective. Therefore, basic environmental parameters such as temperature and pressure must be carefully controlled. This can be very difficult and expensive to accomplish, especially in the confines of a deliverable weapon.

Then there is the problem of delivery. In practice it is quite difficult to ensure efficient delivery and dispersion of weaponized organisms. Wind, humidity and thermal patterns can easily frustrate a weapon. And then there are even more subtle problems. While devastating, pathogens require very specific environments and constraints in order to infect. It is usually not enough simply present the microorganism to the enemy and then wait for them to die. The pathogen must be presented in the correct ecological fashion. Some organisms are stricter than others in this regard, but it is always the case that the ecological nature and epidemiology of the disease must be understood before it can be utilized for war.

Unfortunately, over the years all of these technical hurdles have been met and solved. The ecological nature of pathogens have been elucidated and those most suitable for warfare have been selected. Special air-conditioned delivery systems, allowing biological weapons to be delivered by missile or plane, have been constructed and deployed. Advanced methods of drying, encapsulation and aerosolization of pathogens have been perfected, such that they can be viably delivered to millions of people. The purely scientific and mechanical issues of weaponization are solved problems. And this technology is now widely available to any nation with an interest in developing such weapons.

Yet there are other drawbacks. Perhaps the most elemental one is that biological weapons are, as we said, biological. Living organisms have their own agenda and are thus not so easily controlled. A pathogen that is applied to an opposing army may easily spread to friendly forces or to a friendly civilian population. Or a military pathogen might be successfully used, only then to lie latent in a field. It does little good to use a biological weapon against a city if that city is then denied to the attacker, due to the potential for further epidemics.

Of course, this calculus only applies militarily. Terrorists may not find these issues to be drawbacks. In fact, they might even be advantages. Even so, given the nature of these weapons, the line between "terrorism" and "military" is a very fine and perhaps artificial distinction. As discussed in the Biological Terrorism archive, historical application of biological weapons in wartime has always had a terrorist element. The Japanese use of biological weapons in World War 2 against China is a case in point. Going forward, this distinction between military use and terrorism may be an academic point.

Because of these issues, professional military men have usually found biological weapons to be unattractive. Not only are these weapons innately awful in the moral sense, but they simply do not fit into the classic military mindset of what constitutes a legitimate weapon. Therefore their development and use has been denied or delayed on countless occasions. Unfortunately, there have also been numerous exceptions to this conservatism. Despite moral repugnance as well as formal treaties barring their development, weapons have been developed and even used. And, as the decades wore on, opposition to biological weapons has gradually faded away.

Therefore national weaponization programs gradually began to accelerate. A standout in this area was the Soviet Union. Under their Biopreparat program the Soviets pioneered biological weaponization on a truly epic scale. Some of the coungtry's brightest minds eagerly participated, as this work was both well-paid and of high status. Anthrax, smallpox and a host of other agents were engineered into stable yet deadly forms. Delivery mechanisms were perfected. ICBMS were loaded and pointed at the enemies of socialism.

And the Soviet Union was not alone. Many states have similar programs, although none to date quite as ambitious as Biopreparat. Particularly among smaller and weaker countries, biological weapons research and deployment has recently become a top priority. Such weapons are perceived as great levelers, allowing these weaker countries to threaten both their neighbors and the world at large with total destruction.

Today we stand at the vanguard of a grim new era. The treaties banning the development and deployment of biological weapons are dead letters. (See the Treaties And Protocols archive.) The United States has publicly renounced these treaties and is actively pursuing new offensive and defensive biological weapons. A handful of other countries have already developed horrific capabilities, armed and at the ready, including weaponized anthrax and smallpox. Dozens of other nations are busily constructing their own arsenals. Why shouldn't they? Biological weapons are cheap, easily deployed, and quite effective. Plus everyone else has them. Therefore it seems prudent to have such weapons as well.

And it does not stop there. Genetic engineering is now actively harnessed to the cause. Incurable forms of existing pathogens - as well as completely artificial organisms - are already deployed. Incurable anthrax, particularly vicious mutants of smallpox, horrific blood fevers, and universally fatal toxins, all these and more await their use in the next war.

So we move into an increasingly unstable world, with apocalyptic weapons spreading like viruses. And yet the world sleeps.